Report on the Workshop “Contested solidarity: Perceptions and attitudes towards the Russian war against Ukraine in Latin America and Europe”,
12 March 2024, Willy Brandt Centre, University of Wrocław
Just over two years ago, the army of the Russian Federation launched a full-fledged attack against neighbouring Ukraine, bringing war, destruction, and human suffering back to Europe on an unprecedented scale since the end of the Second World War. Probably the best news of the last two years was that the supposedly second largest army in the world failed miserably to subjugate its neighbouring country militarily. This was due on the one hand to the tactical and logistical mistakes and shortcomings of the Russian army, and on the other hand to the massive and extremely brave resistance of Ukraine, supported by military aid from the West, which not only managed to prevent the worst, but was also able to achieve considerable military successes and recaptures of occupied territories. However, after more than two years of fierce fighting, the current situation for Ukraine looks extremely grim again. Following the very limited successes of the Ukrainian counter-offensive last year, the Russian army has once again gone on the offensive and is slowly gaining ground. The reason for this is the overwhelming superiority in weapons, ammunition and soldiers of a much larger country on the one hand, and the failure of Western partners to equip the Ukrainian army with what it needs on the other. While Western military support has been hesitant and half-hearted from the outset, we are currently facing a particularly critical situation: in the USA, the decisive aid package has been blocked in Congress due to the presidential election campaign and, with a possible victory for Donald Trump in November 2024, US support might collapse completely. And instead of preparing for this worst-case scenario, the most important powers in Europe, France and Germany, are celebrating their disunity and indecision in front of the eyes of the world. Yet international security experts have been warning for months that if Russian aggression is not stopped in Ukraine, the West will soon have to stop it at a NATO border.
Against this backdrop, the Workshop “Contested Solidarity” that took place on 12 of March at the Willy Brandt Centre of the University of Wrocław, explored perceptions and public debates triggered by the aggression against Ukraine in various countries in Europe and other world regions in order to understand the reasons for the insufficient Western support for the Ukrainian war effort. The focus was on the one hand on public debates and the general mood regarding in Germany and Hungary, two extremely different EU member states, and on the other hand on the perceptions of the war in the most important countries of Latin America and the role of Russian propaganda in the region. The panel was composed of the sociologist Prof Dr Oksana Danylenko (WBZ), the political scientist Dr Maciej Olejnik (WBZ) and the two international relation experts Dr Jochen Kleinschmidt (University of Dresden) and Prof Dr Vladimir Rouvinski (University ICESI, Cali). The workshop was organized and moderated by Prof Dr Sören Brinkmann (WBZ).
In her introductory presentation entitled “Ukrainian soldiers in contemporary Ukraine”, Oksana Danylenko pointed out that the Russian aggression did not begin in 2022 but had already started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the establishment of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic”. In fact Russia began to seize territories in the east of Ukraine, using, in addition to its hidden military participation, discursive manipulations in the mass media, organizing pseudo-protests and pseudo-referendums etc. However, most Western countries had barely reacted to this early Russian aggression and only became fully aware of Russia’s neo-imperialist agenda with the beginning of a full-scale war in February 2022. Professor Danylenko did not only present the results of a research on the life world of Ukrainian soldiers based on interviews that were conducted in 2016-2017 in Ukraine, but also spoke about Russia’s war against Ukraine since 2014. She painted an impressive and very emotional picture of the heavy burden that the war situation in eastern Ukraine has placed on the soldiers since 2014. In addition, Professor Danylenko described the current situation in Ukraine from the beginning of a full-scale war until today, and shared statements of Ukrainian students related to the war situation in their country. She emphasized the criminal character of Russia’s actions against Ukraine: an unprovoked full-scale invasion of the country, numerous war crimes against civilians, the multiple destruction of residential buildings and civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, universities and also critical infrastructure facilities. And every day Ukrainian soldiers are fighting for Ukraine’s freedom and thus preventing Russia from extending its military aggression to other neighbouring countries. Oksana Danylenko also emphasized that even the fact that they do not allow the Russian army to advance further is heroism.
The following presentation with the title “From Realpolitik to Surrealpolitik? Russia’s War in Ukraine and the Discursive Antinomies of the Berlin Republic” was delivered by Jochen Kleinschmidt and focussed on the introspection in Germany’s strategic discourse provoked by the Russian attack on Ukraine. After the Chancellor’s declaration of Zeitenwende a few days after the war had started in 2022, it initially appeared that the country would transition smoothly from a neutralistic and largely commercially oriented foreign policy to a growing emphasis on alliance politics, rearmament, and the supply of weaponry to Ukraine. However, this shift, generally welcomed among Germany’s allies, has also been accompanied with a governmental discourse that could be described as Surrealpolitik (John Schoneboom). In the German case, this discourse is structured by antinomies: The war is simultaneously a catastrophic break with past expectations of peaceful coexistence – yet, at the same time, a return to normalcy is imminent. German leaders are prudently avoiding any potential risks of escalation – however, they were completely unaware of the possibility of aggression before February 2022. Germany is competently co-managing Western reactions to the war on an equal footing with the great powers – yet, it is condemned to a complete lack of agency regarding the actual course of events. While these antinomies may represent, to a certain degree, a reflection of a general German unease in dealing with the first great power war in Europe since the Second World War, they also bear the hallmarks of previous surreal waves of post-truth politics in other countries. At the same time, they beg the question whether such a reaction has been generally typical of postwar Germany’s reaction to armed conflicts in its vicinity, or whether it actually represents a genuinely new quality in German political discourse.
In his contribution entitled “Hungary’s response to the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine”, Dr Maciej Olejnik then examined the special, openly pro-Putin role of the Hungarian government under Viktor Orbán and analysed the political, social and mental background to this unusual position in the context of the European Union. The speaker put a special emphasis on how the war is portrayed by the Hungarian government, in particular, by its prime minister Orbán, as well as by the Hungarian media outlets under the conditions of severely restricted media freedom and freedom of opinion. Furthermore, Dr Olejnik discussed the current Hungarian-Russian investments and explained in what way – and contrary to the EU’s sanctions policy – Hungary supports Russia during the war. At the same time, the speaker examined openly anti-Ukrainian policies of the government, which are expressed in the fact that, for instance, Hungary rejected all calls to send weapons to Ukraine. All in all, with regard to Hungary’s pro-Putinist policy, Dr Olejnik’s presentation pointed to a special political-mental state of conscience of the government, which is apparently also supported by broad sections of the population and is based on deep historical roots, which ultimately go back to the national humiliation of the country through the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War.
The fourth and final talk was delivered by Prof Vladimir Rouvinski whose presentation, entitled “Latin American Perspectives on Russia’s War in Ukraine: A View from Afar?”, shifted attention away from the European theatre to the region of Latin America. According to the speaker, in today’s Latin America, Russia’s war against Ukraine is perceived as something very distant and with almost no relevance for the region. This view is shared even by those (very few) public opinion leaders and decision-makers who openly condemn Russia for violating basic principles of international law and human rights. Thus, for the majority of Latin Americans, the war is not among their priorities, which facilitates Moscow’s propaganda efforts to keep Latin America away from critical debates. At the same time, public indifference towards the war against Ukraine favors the new foreign policy strategy of “active non-alignment”, which eventually benefits Putin’s interests while indirectly legitimising the open breaches of international law and relativising the innumerous human rights crimes committed by Russia.
The four presentations were followed by a lively discussion between the audience and the speakers, which revealed a great deal of public interest and the continuing need for information, thus clearly emphasising the enormous relevance of such events for the future.
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Authors: Sören Brinkmann and Oksana Danylenko (WBZ/UWr)
